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What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?
Martha Minow*
On February 10, 1995, Hillary Rodham Clinton announced
that the United States Ambassador to the United Nations would
sign the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Childi
(the "Convention") and seek ratification in the Senate.2 Observ-
ers immediately predicted a Senate fight led by those who argue
that the measure - which 176 nations have signed - could
weaken parental authority.3 This exchange in an abbreviated
form illustrates a striking feature of discussions about children's
rights: at least as a rhetorical matter they are commonplace
among the international human rights community, but they re-
main controversial within significant sectors of this country.
Another illustration appeared in the 1992 campaign attacks on
Hillary Rodham Clinton for the articles she wrote during the
1970s advocating rights for children; those articles stimulated
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. Thanks for the superb research
assistance of Liz Tobin, and additional help by Laurie Corzett, Jane Park, Jus-
tin Weiss, Terry Swanlund, and Liz Yap. An earlier version of this piece was
presented as the Lockhart Lecture at the University of Minnesota Law School
on March 16, 1995. A related piece will appear in THE S=xrIEs (Stephen Macedo
ed., forthcoming 1996).
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, GA. Res. 44125,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/441736 (1989). The
treaty became international law in 1990; as of February 1995 it had been signed
by 176 nations. See U.S. Finally Agrees to Sign UN Accord for Children, CHI.
TRm., Feb. 12, 1995, at 22 (discussing Hillary Clinton's announcement during a
memorial service for former UNICEF director James Grant).
2. See John F. Harris, U.S. to Sign U.N. Pact on Child Rights, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 11, 1995, at A3 (stating that the administration's decision to sign the
Convention set up "a possible ratification battle in the Senate with conserva-
tives who argue that the measure might weaken the authority of parents"). The
United States signed the Convention on February 16, 1995, but the Senate has
not yet ratified it. See Jaya Dayal, U.S. Children, U.N. Convention Gets U.S.
Support, INT'L. PRESS SERV., Feb. 16, 1995 (noting that the United States "re-
mains on the list of 22 countries that have yet to ratiw" the Convention).
3. Harris, supra note 2 (discussing critics' contentions that the Conven-
tion might allow children to sue parents).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
critics and opponents to satirize the claim for children's rights as
children seeking to "divorce" their parents.
4
Quite apart from the recent movement for children's rights
in the international human rights world, a diverse group of peo-
ple urged an agenda for children's rights in this country during
the 1960s and 1970s. In this Essay, I will situate that earlier
movement between an even older history of advocacy for chil-
dren and a subsequently troubled history of child advocacy from
the 1980s to the present. The history is tangled at times. You
might watch for the entrance and exit of five legal frameworks
for thinking about children: child protection, child liberation,
children as potential adults, children in need of traditional au-
thority, and social resource redistribution. I will close by assess-
ing what the historical analysis could or should mean for a
political and legal agenda for children, for rights, and for all of
us as we head into the next century.
I. THE SIXTIES AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CHILD
LIBERATION, CHILD PROTECTION, AND
CHILDREN AS POTENTIAL ADULTS
Hillary Rodham Clinton was a law student when she wrote
her now famous Harvard Education Review article entitled Chil-
dren Under the Law.5 There, and in two subsequent pieces writ-
ten during the 1970s, 6 she reviewed the emerging children's
rights movement and argued that courts should stop assuming
4. See, e.g., Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., How Much Power Should a Child
Wield, Anyway?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1992, at 57 (citing a humorist's sketch
that set forth a "worst-case scenario": "Your Honor, my client, 13-year-old So-
phie Roundabout, wishes to obtain a divorce from her parents and younger sis-
ter because of irreconcilable differences."); see also Eleanor Clift with Pat
Wingert, Hillary Clinton's Not-So-Hidden Agenda, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992,
at 90, 90 (discussing Republicans' ridicule of Clinton as a radical feminist who
promoted left-wing causes that undermined family values); Mimi Hall, GOP At-
tacks Hillary Clinton on Children's Rights, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1992, at 7A
(analyzing Republicans' use of Clinton's articles on children's rights to paint her
as a liberal who promoted the break-up of families).
5. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 487
(1973) [hereinafter Rodham, Children Under the Law]. Clinton had worked as
a student on a project at the Yale-New Haven Hospital; her task was to define
the standards for judging child abuse. See also Garry Wills, H.R. Clinton's
Case, 39 N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Mar. 5, 1992, at 3, 3 (discussing Clinton's article
and her subsequent efforts as Arkansas's First Lady to promote awareness of
children's issues).
6. Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S
RIGHTs: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21 (Alicia A. Vardin & Ilene M. Brody
eds., 1979) [hereinafter Rodham, Children's Rights]; Hillary Rodham, Chil-
dren's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect, 86 YALE L.J. 1522 (1977) (reviewing
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that all children are legally incompetent until they reach the age
of majority.7 Instead, she argued, the question of competence
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.8 She also observed
that children's rights seemed "a slogan in search of a definition"9
and recommended careful study of both the psychological and
legal issues implicated by the idea of rights for children.10
Republican campaign strategists who dug up these articles
during the 1992 presidential campaign assaulted her views as
radical. Some charged that Clinton "believes kids should be able
to sue their parents rather than helping with the chores they
were asked to do."'1 Other less partisan observers commented
that Clinton's views were "comparatively mild versions of what
GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE CHILDREN'S CAUSE (1976)) [hereinafter Rodham, Chil-
dren's Policies].
7. See Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 5, at 489 (stating
that using an artificial dividing point of eighteen or twenty-one obscures simi-
larities between older children and adults); Rodham, Children's Policies, supra
note 6, at 1522 (noting that concepts about children's capacities were undergo-
ing tremendous change at the time the article was written); Rodham, Children's
Rights, supra note 6, at 33 (criticizing the law's treatment of a newborn, a
twelve year-old and a sixteen year-old as equally incompetent).
8. Clinton suggested that general minority status be eliminated and a
presumption of competency implemented instead. Rodham, Children Under the
Law, supra note 5, at 507-09. She reiterated the importance of reversing the
presumption of incompetency and implementing case-by-case assessments in
her 1979 article. Rodham, Children's Rights, supra note 6, at 33.
9. Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 5, at 487.
10. Id. at 487; see also David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family,
and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23-28
(1980) (arguing that chronological age only approximates maturity, and that
therefore judges should make case-by-case determinations rather than use a
presumption of immaturity).
11. Hall, supra note 4, at 7A (quoting GOP Chairman Rich Bond). Many
observers linked Clinton's writings to the 1992 Gregory K lawsuit, character-
ized by critics as a child seeking a "divorce" from his mother. See Reynolds
Holding, Children Are Losing, Not Gaining Rights, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 27,
1992, at Al (characterizing the political attacks on Clinton's legal writings as
due in part to the timing of the Gregory K decision). Clinton herself never ad-
vocated "divorce suits" by children against their parents. Clift, supra note 4, at
90. Gregory K actually involved a foster child seeking to prompt the state to
terminate the parental rights of his biological mother so that his foster parents
could adopt him. In Interest of Kingsley, No. JU90-5245, 1992 WL 551484, at *1
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1992) [hereinafter Gregory K]. See generally Howard Da-
vidson, Making Too Much of 'Gregory I - and Too Little, CHILDREN'S LEGAL
RTS. J., Fall 1992, at inside front cover (placing Gregory K in the context of a
nationwide epidemic of child maltreatment); Andrew L. Shapiro, Children in
Court: The New Crusade, THE NATION, Sept. 27, 1993, at 301 (discussing Greg-
ory K and its mischaracterization by critics of children's rights advocates).
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the children's rights movement wanted at the time."12 Indeed,
in books such as John Holt's Escape from Childhood 3 and Rich-
ard Farson's Birthrights,4 some child liberationists in the early
1970s viewed children as the next group entitled, like blacks and
women, to a civil rights revolution. 5
Bearing the imprint of the optimistic and at times revolu-
tionary rhetoric of the 1960s, 16 child liberationists like Holt and
Farson drew on works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John
Dewey 17 to argue that children deserve rights to participate
fully in society, 8 that adult perceptions of children as depen-
dent reflected their own experiences of subjugation,19 and that
experiments such as an open-school of the American Sum-
merhill Society2° showed children's capacities to participate in
12. John Leo, Who's Right on Children's Rights?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6,
1992, at 5/Zi; see also Holding, supra note 11, at Al (arguing that Republican
critics of Clinton wrongly assumed children were gaining rights when "children
are losing ground in the American legal system").
13. JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974).
14. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974).
15. See id. at 10-11, 216-19 (analogizing children's liberation to earlier
movements by blacks and women); see also Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross, In-
troduction to THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS' MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRES-
SION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 1, 1 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross eds., 1977) (arguing
that "young people are the most oppressed of all minorities"); Leo, supra note
12, at 5/Z1 (characterizing the children's rights movement as a successor to
other "anti-authoritarian" movements). Hillary Rodham Clinton and Peter
Edelman both explicitly drew analogies comparing children with blacks and wo-
men. See Peter Edelman, The Children's Rights Movement, in THE CHILDREN's
RIGHTS MovEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, supra, at
203, 203 (noting that black people, women, and children have all been consid-
ered chattel in the past); Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 5, at 493
(comparing childhood to marriage and slavery as institutions rationalized as
caring for people who society assumed were incapable of caring for themselves).
16. "The sixties" actually represents a time period that stretched well into
the next decade. It was a time of social and political activism with creative and
at times conflictual challenges to the status quo treatment of civil rights, gender
relations, generational politics, and sexuality. See ROSALIND EKMAN LADD,
CHILDREN'S RIGHT'S RE-VIsIONED: PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 2 (1995) (noting
that the children's rights movement emerged in the 1960s, "riding the wave of
concern for unfairly treated groups").
17. Farson discusses the historical roots of the child liberation movement
and traces its strongly ideological commitment to freedom for children to works
by Rousseau and Dewey. FARSON, supra note 14, at 9 (citing JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Barbara Foxley trans., Dutton 1974) (1762); JOHN DEWEY,
EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938)).
18. FARsON, supra note 14, at 3; HOLT, supra note 13, at 18-19.
19. FARSON, supra note 14, at 6-8.
20. Summerhill was an English residential school based on principles of
freedom and equality of children and student participation in the operation of
the school. Id. at 52.
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self-governance. 21 A publication of the radical caucus at Sum-
merhill at one point quoted Huey Newton of the Black Panthers
as saying "[a]n unarmed people are slaves."22 The publication
continued, "[wle are asking for a 'human' standard to arm kids
with, within which we as adults can deal with our own problems
and uptightedness while kids are free to determine their own
lives."23 Many liberationists argued that children's voices were
wrongly absent even from public discussions of children's
rights.
24
John Holt, for example, urged equal legal treatment so that
children would be like adults before the law.25 He specifically
promoted children's rights to vote, work for money, sign con-
tracts, manage their own educations, travel, and form their own
families.26 Richard Farson's agenda called for the creation of al-
ternative home environments. 27 He urged children's rights to
information, self-education, freedom from physical punishment,
sexual freedom, and economic and political participation. 28 He
also advocated the full extension of legal protections to young
21. Id. at 52-53.
22. Paul Goodman, Reflections on Children's Rights, in THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note
15, at 140, 141-42. In this essay, Goodman reassessed his own early participa-
tion in child liberation debates in which he had argued that society, rather than
young people, was to blame for the problems of "deviance." Id.; see also PAUL
GOODMAN, GROWING Up ABSURD 13-14 (1960) (discussing the ways in which
American society transforms bright, lively children into resigned or cynical
adults).
23. Goodman, Reflections on Children's Rights, supra note 22, at 141-42.
24. See, e.g., Helen Baker, Growing Up Unheard, in THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note
15, at 187, 189 (citing two Harvard Educational Review issues on children's
rights that do not contain any articles by people under the age of eighteen);
Youth Liberation of Ann Arbor, We Do Not Recognize Their Right to Control Us,
in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG
PEOPLE, supra note 15, at 125, 128-34 (setting forth the history of the Youth
Liberation of Ann Arbor and members' struggle to make their voices heard).
Even more moderate authors treated the general subject of children and the
law as an issue about the distribution of power and responsibility among child,
family and state. See, e.g., Robert M. Mnookin, Foreword to Symposium on
Children and the Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 1, 2-3 (ana-
lyzing how the family and state dominate the lives of children and how power
should be allocated among the three groups).
25. HOLT, supra note 13, at 18-19.
26. John Holt, Why Not a Bill of Rights for Children?, in THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEM:ENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, supra note
15, at 319, 324-25.
27. FARSON, supra note 14, at 52-62.
28. Farson devoted chapters to each of these topics in BIRTHRIGHTS. FAR-
SON, supra note 14, at 83-190.
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people charged with violating the law.29 Other liberationists
challenged schools as repressive and authoritariano and urged
schools to adopt "open classrooms," allowing students to select
their own activities and pursue their own interests.
31
Yet alongside those who urged children's rights to liberate
young people from a constraining status worked others who also
advocated for children, but sought new protections, services, or
care.3 2 The editors of a 1977 volume entitled The Children's
Rights Movement: Overcoming the Oppression of Young People
33
concluded, for example, that "some children need vastly more
help, protection, and concern, while others need less hovering
over, channeling, and imposition of adult standards."3 4 Advo-
cates in this vein worked to protect children through judicial rul-
ings, legislation, changes in existing programs, and a public
rhetoric about children.35 Henry H. Foster, for example, wrote
an influential "Bill of Rights" for children that compared chil-
dren with blacks and women as people deserving equal treat-
ment under the law.3 6 At the same time, Foster acknowledged
justifications for age distinctions3 7 and argued for some rights as
claims upon society, such as rights to medical care.
38
29. Id. at 200, 211-12.
30. See, e.g., CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 122-24 (1970)
(citing a preoccupation with order and control as schools' most important
characteristic).
31. See id. at 266-69 (outlining how open classrooms could be implemented
in the United States); see generally James Rothenberg, The Open Classroom
Reconsidered, ELEMENTARY SCH. J., Sept. 1989, at 69 (reviewing the history of
open classrooms and recommending that they be reevaluated in a more positive
light).
32. See LADD, supra note 16, at 2 (discussing the tension between protec-
tionists, who emphasized children's rights to assistance and care from adults,
and liberationists, who favored children's rights to self-determination).
33. Gross & Gross, supra note 15.
34. Id. at 12.
35. See generally KENNETH KENNISTON, ALL OUR CHILDREN 183-211 (1977)
(discussing the legal strategies of the child protectionist movement).
36. HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN (1977). Fos-
ter notes in his introduction that "[tihe same arguments that were advanced for
and against the abolition of slavery and the emancipation of women recur when
issues arise regarding the moral and legal rights of children." Id. at 6.
37. Foster states that "[aln age differential may justify legal distinctions
based on chronological age if the stage of maturation has relevance to the par-
ticular problem." Id. at 7. He then gives the examples of consent for marriage,
driver licenses, and hazardous employment. Id.
38. Item seven in Foster's Bill of Rights is "[t]o seek and obtain medical
care and treatment and counseling"; item eight is "[t]o receive special care, con-
sideration, and protection in the administration of law and justice so that [the
child's] best interests are always a paramount factor." Id. at xv.
272 [Vol. 80:267
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The child protectionists also included presidential leader-
ship advocating special programs and services for children.
President Lyndon Johnson sent the first congressional message
devoted exclusively to children in 1967, and called for a range of
medical, social service, summer employment, and compensatory
education programs for children.3 9 Perhaps even more notably,
President Richard Nixon, within a month of his inauguration in
1969, called for a "national commitment to providing all Ameri-
can childreii with an opportunity for healthful and stimulating
development during the first five years of life."40 Nixon took
pains to express along with the commitment to child welfare his
respect for "the sacred right of parents to rear their children ac-
cording to their own values and own understandings."41
Whether liberationists or protectionists - or something in
between - growing numbers of advocates for children in the
1960s and 1970s found that the language of rights offered a way
to argue for both more protection and more independence for dif-
ferent children, or for the same children in different circum-
stances. 42 Participants in the 1970 White House Conference on
Children, continuing a tradition of similar conferences held each
decade since 1909, used a rhetoric of children's rights that de-
parted from prior discussions at earlier conferences, which in-
stead used notions of children's needs.43
39. GILBERT STEINER, THE CmHLDREN's CAUSE 10-11 (1976).
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id.
42. See Michael Grossberg, Children's Legal Rights? A Historical Look at a
Legal Paradox, in CHILDREN AT RISK 111, 126-32 (Roberta Wollans ed., 1993)
(discussing the development of the language used to describe children's rights).
Child advocates in an early period also used the language of rights. Id. at 114-
26. As Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover presented Congress with a pro-
posal for a Children's Bill of Rights. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOmS OF HER-
BERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1920-1933, at 99-100, 261-64
(1952). But the earlier uses of "rights" language either referred specifically to
efforts to achieve earlier emancipation - and adult legal status - or else to
legitimate paternalism and enlarged use of state power to protect children.
Grossberg, supra, at 115-16, 121. Advocates may have tried at times to collapse
needs and rights but courts resisted that tendency until the 1960s. Id. at 122,
126.
43. Rochelle Beck, White House Conferences on Children: An Historical
Perspective, 43 HARv. EDuc. Rnv. 653, 662-63 (1973); see also SHEILA M. ROTH-
M, WOM d'S PROPER PLACE 268-71 (1980) (discussing the 1970 White House
Conference on Children); STEINER, supra note 39, at 122-30 (discussing the
1970 White House Conference on Children and previous White House confer-
ences). The Reagan Administration canceled the 1981 event. Edward Zigler &
Susan Muenchow, How to Influence Social Policy Affecting Children and Fami-
lies, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 415, 419 (1984).
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The rights-based model of legal advocacy for blacks in-
formed the most effective national organization for children.
When Marion Wright Edelman founded the Children's Defense
Fund ("CDF") in 1973, she drew on her experiences as a civil
rights attorney and on her involvement with Head Start"4 and
child development programs focusing on poor and minority chil-
dren.4 5 CDF from the start advocated due process protections
prior to school suspension, and a right to privacy for children
regarding their school and juvenile court records. CDF also
sought to pursue the same kind of sustained advocacy for chil-
dren that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund insti-
gated for people of color.
46
Yet Edelman's initial agenda for CDF included challenging
the exclusion of children from school, the labeling and treatment
of children with special needs, the use of children in medical ex-
perimentation, and the quality of day care - all comfortably
within the tradition of child protection.47 Edelman said explic-
itly in 1974, "we are not a children's liberation operation ....
Children are not simply another oppressed minority group who
could function independently if allowed to do so.... We don't
yet have a sound enough conceptual framework to approach chil-
dren's rights."48 Edelman hoped for such a framework as part of
a long-term strategy but also maintained that CDF should work
in the meantime for specific and immediate relief.
49
Nonetheless, Edelman drew on the rhetoric of rights in
helping draft the Comprehensive Child Development Act of
1971.50 The preamble to the Act, in Edelman's words, "put the
nation on record as saying that children have certain rights: to
basic nutrition, health care, education, and child developmental
care in their early years," regardless of each family's ability to
44. See generally EDWARD ZIGLER & SusAN UENCHOW, HEAD START (1992)
(discussing the goals, development, and implementation of Head Start, a public
program assisting poor children and their families before the children reach
school age).
45. An Interview with Marian Wright Edelman, 44 HARv. EDUC. REv. 53,
67-68 (1974) [hereinafter Interview]; see also JoAN J. BURCH, MARION WRIGHT
EDELMAN: CHILDREN'S CHAMPION 5-6, 20-34 (1994) (discussing the life of Mar-
ian Wright Edelman and her involvement in children's rights issues).
46. Interview, supra note 45, at 53-54.
47. Id. at 54-60.
48. Id. at 66-67.
49. Id. at 67; see also STEINER, supra note 39, at 170-75 (discussing Marian
Wright Edelman's involvement in children's advocacy and describing CDF's de-
velopment and strategy).
50. H.R. 6748, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
[Vol. 80:267
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pay.51 President Nixon accompanied his veto of the Act with a
message warning that federal support for child care would lead
to communal child rearing, contrary to American family values;
Edelman defended the Act as one mandating parental control.52
This example illustrates both the dominant association of gov-
ernment programs with communism and the political and prac-
tical difficulties in articulating rights for children without
seeming to undermine parental authority.
This same set of difficulties marked litigation over chil-
dren's rights in the 1960s and 1970s. Advocates for children
used the rhetoric of rights not only to place children in the same
legal position as adults53 but also to seek special protections.
54
Courts sometimes accepted one or both of these formulations,
but also often responded with concerns about governmental
power or about threats to parental authority.55 It is tempting to
treat the late 1960s and early 1970s as the high-water mark of
children's rights, but a closer look suggests the better descrip-
tion of an intense period of debate over children's rights.
Consider litigation in the United States Supreme Court; it
is a small and selective sample, but nonetheless a body of espe-
cially influential decisions. This sample unmistakably reflects
the impact of the civil rights and student rights movements of
the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided
in In re Gault that the Constitution protected a child who faced
commitment to a state institution.56 Accordingly, the juvenile
court must assure a right to counsel,57 a right against self-
incrimination,58 a right to notice of charges, 59 and a right to con-
front and cross-examine accusers.60 In 1969, the Court assured
public school students some degree of First Amendment rights
in a case involving students disciplined for wearing black arm
51. Interview, supra note 45, at 71.
52. Id.; see also ROTIMAN, supra note 43, at 275-76 (discussing the views of
Edelman and Nixon on the Child Development Act). Joseph M. Hawes cites the
defeat of the Comprehensive Child Development Act in 1971 as the beginning of
the downhill slope of the children's rights movement. JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE
CHILDREN's RIGHTS MovEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADvOCAcY AND PROTECTION 119
(1991).
53. HAWES, supra note 52, at 115-17.
54. Id. at 117-18.
55. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text (discussing children's
rights cases decided in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
56. 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id. at 55.
59. Id. at 33.
60. Id. at 56.
1995]
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bands to protest the Vietnam War.6 ' And in 1975, the Court in
Goss v. Lopez ruled that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required notice of charges and reasons as
well as an opportunity for a student to present his case prior to
suspension from public school.62 These cases reflected social sci-
ence criticisms of the juvenile court, national turmoil over the
Vietnam War and racial tensions, and widespread legal chal-
lenges to unfettered authority.63 They also reflected shifting
views of the legal and political status of children and young
people.
Prompted in part by successful test case litigation in the
lower courts, the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act
was a notable legislative development that articulated rights of
children with disabilities to education and related services.
64
Growing from medical studies of battered children, legislative
initiatives also provided federal aid to stimulate improvement of
state responses to child abuse, neglect, and adoption.65 These
61. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
62. 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
63. See Franklin E. Zimring & Rayman L. Solomon, Goss v. Lopez: The
Principle of the Thing, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 459, 459-72 (Robert
Mnookin ed., 1985) (discussing the racial dimensions of Goss v. Lopez).
64. Education for All Handicapped Children's Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see
also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp.
715, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (approving a judgment that inmates of a state
facility have a right to a minimum quality of care or treatment even if their
confinement is not voluntary); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 768-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (granting a prelim-
inary injunction to correct deficiencies affecting physical safety and risk of
physical deterioration to mentally retarded inmates); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302-03 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(holding that mentally retarded children can no longer be excluded from a pub-
lic program of education); see generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIF-
FERENCE: INCLUSION, ExCLusION AND AMERICAN LAw 35-39, 81-83 (1990)
(discussing the Education for All Handicapped Childrens Act and its
application).
65. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 1, 94
Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (estab-
lishing a federal program providing adoption assistance, strengthening foster
care assistance for needy and dependent children, and providing aid to families
with dependent children); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (current version at Pub. L. No. 100-294, tit. 1,
§ 101, 102 Stat. 102 (1988)) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (authorizing federal financial assistance for programs and projects
designed to prevent, identify, and treat child abuse and neglect); see generally
BARBARA NELSON, MAING AN ISSUE OF CmLD ABUSE 39-44, 58-59, 76-136
(1984) (discussing medical research on child abuse and the development of laws
dealing with child abuse).
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developments combined conceptions of children's procedural
rights restricting the discretion of public decisionmakers with
notions of children's needs that the larger society should meet.
Most basically, these decisions departed from the traditional
view of children as properly subjected to parental and institu-
tional authority beyond state review because such authorities no
longer seemed entirely trustworthy. The Supreme Court, and
thus the law of the land, began to recognize children as distinct
individuals deserving a direct relationship with the state under
a legal regime protecting liberties against both public and pri-
vate authorities.
Halting the report of legal developments here, however,
would be quite misleading. The year 1971 brought a Supreme
Court decision refusing to extend the constitutional right to a
jury in juvenile court proceedings. 66 In 1972, the Court permit-
ted Amish parents to keep their children out of high school with-
out calling for any consideration of the children's views on the
matter.67 In 1977, the Court in Ingraham v. Wright ruled that a
teacher's use of corporal punishment - a beating with a wooden
paddle - required no prior due process hearing but only the
possibility of a subsequent tort action.68
The Court's decisions in these cases indicate legal ambiva-
lence in the face of repeated efforts by advocates to extend con-
stitutional rights to children. Ambivalence here should not be
misconstrued as a kind of wishy-washy balancing act. Ambiva-
lence is that wonderful word for our simultaneous commitments
and attractions to inconsistent things. The Court's ambivalence
swings between two starkly contrasting alternatives. One
would extend adult rights to children; the other would treat chil-
dren in important ways as subject to different authorities, insti-
tutions, and relationships than adults.69
Advocates for children's rights sometimes resolved the ten-
sion between protection and liberation through a conception of
children as potential adults, deserving rights but needing care
on the way to adulthood. For example, Peter Edelman, husband
of Marion Wright Edelman and a longstanding child advocate
himself, served as director of the New York State Division for
66. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-34 (1972).
68. 430 U.S. 651, 657, 682 (1977).
69. See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Ap-
proach to Children's Rights, 9 HARv. WoMns'S L.J. 1, 3-14, 19-20 (1986) (dis-
cussing conditions in the legal treatment of children).
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Youth in the 1970s.70 In 1977, he described a position that fa-
vored some rights for children but searched for a program re-
sponsive to children's needs. He explicitly resisted the goal of
"total parity of rights for children" and instead argued that the
proper goal would "extend some adult rights and improve gov-
ernment programs so that children will be assured protection
and dignity and the chance to develop their maximum poten-
tial."71 Unclear himself about which additional adult rights
should be extended and which should be modified, Edelman
lauded children's freedom of religion, racial equality, freedom of
expression, procedural due process, and the right to privacy -
adult-type rights - along with a right to education that would
be unique to children.
72
Where in this vision should entitlement programs - for day
care, for medical services - fit? When should children be given
second chances and protections against criminal punishments,
civil liabilities, or other obligations placed on adults? The advo-
cates' own uncertainty about the scope of children's rights pro-
duced no clear answers to these questions and left them largely
open to political and institutional pressures.
II. THE LEGACY OF AN EARLIER CHILD-SAVING
MOVEMENT
Some ambivalence in the courts about children's rights thus
may have reflected disagreements among advocates for children.
Perhaps ironically, some of the most vivid issues cast as claims
of rights for children arose in response to the institutions cre-
ated by a prior generation of child advocates. Between 1880 and
1930, reformers around the country identified the special needs
of children as an appropriate subject for public response. 73
70. Peter Edelman later became a law professor, and then counsel to Secre-
tary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
71. Edelman, supra note 15, at 203-04.
72. Id. at 204-06.
73. See, e.g., Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in Modern America 1870s-
1990s, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMEIcA 3, 3 (Roberta Wollens ed., 1993) (dis-
cussing John Dewey, a progressive who argued that the state should undertake
certain social functions that had been previously undertaken by family or
church); Margo Horn, Inventing the Problem Child: "At-Risk" Children in the
Child Guidance Movement of the 1920s and 1930s, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN
AMERICA, supra, at 141, 141-42 (describing the founding, growth, and change of
child guidance clinics instigated by the desire of progressives to care for chil-
dren by striking a balance between education/nurturing and treatment/cure).
The child-saving movement was itself part of the larger movement for social
and political change organized by the Progressive Era reformers. See CHARLES
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Some of the reformers participated in the settlement house
movement74 to assist recent immigrants; others drew specifi-
cally on emerging social and psychological sciences to shift from
moral to treatment approaches in social programs. Initiatives to
address child welfare ranged from laws requiring school attend-
ance7 5 to those restricting child labor.7 6 These Progressive Era
reformers launched a "child-saving" movement with a focus on
children's welfare, confidence in experts, and acceptance of the
government as a paternal presence in children's lives.
77
The juvenile court under challenge in In re Gault78 was it-
self a product of Progressive Era reforms, notably fueled by Jane
Addams, Florence Kelley, and other settlement house workers
in the late 1890s. Imbued with the turn-of-the century belief in
scientific expertise and a malleable human nature, the original
design of juvenile courts counted on the benevolence of judges
and the possibilities of therapeutic treatment to address misbe-
havior by both children and their parents.79 By removing young
people from adult courts and bringing them to a special institu-
tion connected with social and psychological experts, the juve-
nile courts rejected the use of procedural safeguards in favor of a
model of therapeutic paternalism.80 Yet within a decade of the
establishment of the first juvenile court in 1899, critics claimed
FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERAm S xx-xXix (1961) (exploring the back-
ground of the progressive movement and describing its social and political
changes); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 169 (1967)
("If humanitarian progressivism had a central theme, it was the child.").
74. This effort brought middle- and upper-class idealist reformers to live in
urban neighborhoods and create community centers with classes, clubs, recrea-
tion, and political activities especially for poor immigrants. See, e.g., JANE AD-
DAMS, TwENTY YEARS AT HuLL-HousE 40-55, 60-64, 89-109 (1938) (describing
one of these centers); see also ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS 9 (1978)
(discussing settlement houses as an attempt to meet the needs of the poor).
75. New York was an example of the trend of the states passing mandatory
school attendance laws. It passed a compulsory school attendance law in 1874
that required children to attend at least 14 weeks of school per year. HAwEs,
supra note 52, at 42.
76. See RYERSON, supra note 74, at 10 (noting that many states were pass-
ing child labor laws).
77. See Michael Grossberg, Children's Legal Rights? A Historical Look at a
Legal Paradox, in CHILDREN AT RISK IN AMERICA, supra note 73, at 111, 119-26.
78. 383 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing In re Gault).
79. See RYERSON, supra note 74, at 28-33 (noting that the belief that chil-
dren were of an innocent nature and not responsible for their acts led reformers
to adopt a juvenile justice system that focused on treatment and not
punishment).
80. See HAwEs, supra note 52, at 37-38 (arguing that experts in psychology
and sociology represented the interests of children through the juvenile court
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this therapeutic approach proved too lenient for juvenile offend-
ers and too intrusive for young people who had broken no laws.81
Social workers, probation officers, and other experts seemed un-
able to deliver the promised improvement in children's behavior
and lives.82 Placement facilities for juvenile offenders became
overcrowded. Social scientists documented abuses by juvenile
court judges and in juvenile correction facilities. Law reformers
used that documentation in the challenges that ultimately pro-
duced In re Gault.
83
Similarly, restrictions on child labor and compulsory educa-
tion - both products of Progressive Era reforms - occasioned
critiques by liberationists in the 1960s and 1970s.8 4 The special
protections for which an earlier generation fought became the
fetters that reformers from the sixties attacked. At the same
time, some advocates for children in the sixties and seventies
sought to continue or extend the earlier era's efforts to meet chil-
dren's special needs through governmental and private pro-
grams.8 5 Both liberationists and protectionists thus harkened
back to the turn-of-the-century reformers, but with opposite
motives.
system and cared for their needs, but they did so without regard for rights or
due process).
81. See id. at 32-34 (documenting the origins and early criticism of the ju-
venile court system).
82. See RYERsoN, supra note 74, at 138, 146-47 (discussing critics who pro-
claimed and studies that indicated the juvenile justice system had failed to pro-
vide the services it promised).
83. See Martha Minow & Richard Weissbourd, Social Movements for Chil-
dren: America's Childhood, 122 DAEDALUS 1, 7-8 (1993) (describing the over-
crowded condition of juvenile facilities); RYERSON, supra note 74, at 150 ("The
gap between the real and the ideal juvenile court seems, then, to have played
some role in [In re Gault and two other] decisions.").
84. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 13, at 172 (arguing that child labor laws
deny children the right to work for money and to spend or save money); id. at
240 (arguing that children should have the right to control and direct their own
learning). In the 1980s, the Reagan administration sought to loosen restric-
tions on child labor not in the name of children's rights but as part of a deregu-
lation move. The Reagan administration also adopted regulations cutting back
on the nutritional quality of federally-funded school lunches, including a rule
treating catsup as a vegetable substitute. After ensuing public criticism, the
administration withdrew the rule. Helen Thomas, WASH. NEWS, Sept. 25, 1991
(UPI am cycle).
85. See HAwES, supra note 52 at 117-21 (referring to child advocacy groups,
such as the CDF, as "e Child Protectors," which have fought and continue to
fight for government programs for children).
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III. REACTIONS TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CHILDREN
IN NEED OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
Considerable opposition could be found to both versions of
rights for children. Whether cast as adult rights extended to
younger people or as special protections tailored for those with
lesser competencies or greater vulernabilities due to youth and
inexperience, rights for children troubled judges, scholars, and
traditionalists who also opposed women's liberation. Thus,
Supreme Court Justices - sometimes in majority opinions,
sometimes in dissents - expressed a third position responding
to both the arguments for state protections for children's welfare
and for extending adult-style rights to children. This third posi-
tion stressed traditional authority and warned against the con-
flicts and disorder that rights for children could engender.
8 6
Whether respecting and protecting the authority of par-
ents,8 7 teachers, 8 or doctors,8 9 this third view rejects rights for
children as either unnecessary or harmful given the relation-
ships of authority and responsibility held by adults in children's
lives. 90 For example, one critic warned in 1976 that "the most
86. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion) (arguing that legal restrictions must sometimes be placed on minors,
and that at times children's rights must yield to parental authority to facilitate
the growth of the child); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979) (concluding
that requiring a formalized, fact-finding hearing in order to admit children to a
state mental hospital will "pose a significant intrusion into the parent-child re-
lationship"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 103-04 (1976) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that forcing minors to gain parental
consent for an abortion is an appropriate method for parents to foster the wel-
fare of their children).
87. See Parham, 422 U.S. at 603-04 (declaring that parents retain "plenary
authority" to seek psychological care for their children and the decision to com-
mit a child to a state mental health facility need not be subject to a formal,
adversary pre-admission hearing); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-36
(1972) (holding that the state cannot force Amish children to attend school
when such attendance conflicts with their religious beliefs and a fundamental
interest of parents to guide the religious future and education of their children);
see generally Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for
Children, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 124-32 (1975) (examining the par-
ent-child relationship and parental autonomy by examining Wisconsin v. Yoder
in detail).
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Ingraham v.
Wright).
89. See Parham, 422 U.S. at 608, 613 ("What is best for a child is an indi-
vidual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each
case.").
90. Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their Rights', 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv.
605, 656-58.
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harmful of the potential consequences is that the long-range in-
terests of children themselves may be irreparably damaged as
the state and parents abandon children to their rights."91
Others suggested that any public effort on behalf of families
could threaten parental autonomy.92 At least one academic ob-
server similarly warned that legalized models would be inappro-
priate for children because courts lack wisdom superior to
parents.93 The introduction of and debate in Congress over the
Family Protection Act indicated strong resistance to legal review
of parental authority.94 From a somewhat different perspective,
the Director of the Children's Rights Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union warned that, given children's actual de-
pendency, expanding rights for children simply could substitute
the state for parental authority.95
Concern about institutional authority infused Justice Pow-
ell's 1975 dissent in Goss v. Lopez. 96 There he argued against
due process protections surrounding school suspensions as un-
wise and unnecessary intrusions on the schools which must
maintain authority and discipline.97 Two years later, Justice
91. Id. at 607; see also CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS LAND
174-78 (1979) (discussing the erosion of paternal authority in modern society
where many forms of traditional family discipline are left to social agencies and
the subsequent impact on parent-child relationships); Edward A. Wynne, What
Are We Doing to Our Children?, PuB. INTEREST, Summer 1981, at 3, 3-4 (argu-
ing that court rulings that have granted greater children's rights, particularly
in the school context, have undermined adult authority, increasing destructive
tendencies in children).
92. See Jane Knitzer, Children's Rights in the Family and in Society, 52
AmER. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 481, 493 (1982) (citing the belief of opponents of
children's rights that any public effort on behalf of the family will threaten pa-
rental autonomy).
93. Burt, supra note 87 at 142-43; see also Knitzer, supra note 92, at 484-
85 (citing Burt and his theory that the courts lack superior wisdom over par-
ents to make family decisions).
94. See S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (providing the text of the Act,
which was never enacted); Karen Flax, Women's Rights and the Proposed Fam-
ily Protection Act, 36 U. MIAn L. REv. 141, 141-51 (1981) (arguing that the
Family Protection Act was an attempt to circumvent Supreme Court cases
granting rights to minors).
95. See Knitzer, supra note 92, at 484 (describing the views of Rena Uvil-
ler, the director of the Children's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union).
96. 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975). See supra note 62 and accompanying text
(discussing Goss v. Lopez).
97. Goss, 419 U.S. at 591, 595; see also Gerald Grant, Children's Rights
and Adult Confusions, PuB. INTEREST, Fall 1982, at 83, 91-92 (arguing that
school discipline procedures fail to reduce discipline problems or instill a
greater sense of fairness). Grant concluded, however, that children deserve
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Powell wrote the majority opinion in Ingraham v. Wright,98 find-
ing no constitutional problem with an act of corporal punish-
ment by a teacher, which after all was a traditional form of
discipline.99
Arguments resisting children's rights claims as inconsistent
with traditional authority bear a strong resemblance to some re-
actions to the women's rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s.
There, too, some observers worried that extending rights beyond
their traditional reach would undermine the smooth operation of
the traditional family, which should be trusted to fulfill its du-
ties to children. °0 0 In addition, many opponents of women's
rights argued that children would suffer if women were "liber-
ated" from conventional roles as wives and mothers.'0 1
These observers were not wrong to predict an impact on
children if women altered traditional family roles. Leaders in
the women's movement specifically and intentionally wanted to
remake the way society raises children. Inspired by popular
works like Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique,10 2 many wo-
men around the country challenged the assumption that women
are destined to be mothers, that wives should be subordinate to
husbands, and that the care of children should fall entirely to
their mothers. 0 3 Friedan and other feminists wrote about
rights to hearings in schools but not through quasi-judicial procedures. Id. at
98.
98. 430 U.S. 651, 672-82 (1977) (recognizing the common law privilege per-
mitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children and find-
ing no Fourteenth Amendment need for procedural safeguards beyond civil tort
actions following an event); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Ingraham).
99. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682.
100. DEBORAH RHODE, JusTicE AND GENDER: SEX DIsCRIMNATION AND THE
LAw 70-77 (1989).
101. See HAwES, supra note 52, at 98 (noting that children's rights advo-
cates and some psychoanalysts felt, in opposition to the feminist movement,
that children needed and had a right to full-time mothering); SyLviA A. HEw-
LEIT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WomEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 183-90
(1986) (arguing that some radical feminists denounced marriage and children
entirely and reviled both mothers and children); ROTHMAN, supra note 43, at
246-47 (discussing an overlap that existed between the growth of the childrens
rights movement and the women's rights movement, and the consequent con-
cern that the women's rights movement would harm the development of
children).
102. Brrr FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
103. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
AGAINST AMERIcAN WOMEN (1991) (discussing the ways in which society views
motherhood and marriage by examining their portrayal in cinema and the me-
dia); SHULA-mITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEx: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
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motherhood as enslaving women and preventing their equality
with men.
10 4
Resistance to rights for children thus stemmed from similar
or identical resistance to rights for women: such rights, critics
feared, would inject conflict and individualism into the sphere of
the family and disturb the usual arrangements for caring for
children.'0 5 Many in the women's movement deliberately
sought new public policies, as well as new family relationships,
to meet the needs of children once women altered their conven-
tional family roles. But opponents of the women's movement
joined others to oppose national child care legislation advanced
by both women's rights and children's rights advocates.'
0 6
Is it fair to blame the women's movement for neglecting
children? Many in the movement specifically attended to chil-
dren's needs but argued that they should be met by fathers as
well as by mothers, or by new societal arrangements such as af-
fordable, quality child care. 10 7 Some women's movement think-
ers specifically supported children's liberation,'08 but none
argued that children should be abandoned or neglected. The
failure to secure rights for children could have reflected fears of
women's liberation quite independent of fears that women would
no longer care for children; one way to keep women in conven-
tional family roles is to appeal to their desires to protect chil-
dren. Moreover, societal neglect of children's needs - indeed,
REVOLUTION 250-74 (1970) (questioning the traditional roles of women in mar-
riage and motherhood).
104. See FIRESTONE, supra note 103, at 82 (describing how maternal regimes
and biology have kept women dependent on men) (quoting SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953)); id. at 81 (arguing that motherhood op-
presses women); FRIEDAN, supra note 102, at 202-05 (arguing that motherhood
and marriage keeps a woman from being "her own person").
105. See Leo, supra note 12, at 5 ("A great many people now understand that
the rights approach will exacerbate friction in the home and open the door for
lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, and 'the helping professions' to make a further
mess of the family."); see also LAuRA M. PURny, IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS? THE
CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 129-49 (1992) (arguing that grant-
ing children the same rights and equal standing in the family "needs to be
avoided at almost any cost" because of the conflicts it will create in the parent-
child relationship).
106. Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 43, at 416.
107. See, e.g., FIRESTONE, supra note 103, at 270 (proposing that child-rear-
ing responsibilities should be shared by men, women, and other children
equally); ROTHMAN, supra note 43, at 243 (describing how the organizers of
NOW advocated the establishment of a national network of day care centers).
108. Shulamith Firestone, for example, explicitly viewed motherhood as op-
pressive to women but also argued for children's liberation. FIRESTONE, supra
note 103, at 81.
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the degradation and social unimportance of children - may
stem from the degradation of traditional women's work.10 9 In
this light, rather than blaming the women's movement, advo-
cates for children should have joined them in challenging the
low status accorded to women and to the work of caring for
children.
This failure of coalition occurred from the women's move-
ment side as well. Some observers criticize the women's move-
ment for failing to place a high enough priority on children's
issues, although discerning the place of children in the priorities
of the national women's movement is a complicated matter. The
National Organization for Women ("NOW"), for example, identi-
fied as priorities in the late 1960s and 1970s child care, nonsex-
ist education for children, and reproductive rights for teens, all
of which could be viewed as concerns reflecting women's needs
more than children's needs. 110 NOW placed child care high on
its agenda in 1968 and 1969111 and periodically thereafter. 112
Some criticized this emphasis on child care as reflecting wo-
men's claims for freedom rather than responding to children's
needs, but Eleanor Smeal defended the focus on child care in
1977 as an issue of economic necessity for families and an issue
of quality education for children.' 1 3
Others have contrasted the alleged failure of the feminist
movement to fight harder for child care with its strong commit-
ments to reproductive freedom and the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.114 Sylvia Ann Hewlett in particular takes the American
feminists to task, comparing the American movement with wo-
men's movements in Europe that focused energy on family poli-
109. See FALUDI, supra note 103, at 363-99 (analyzing occupations from
sales positions to the military, demonstrating the pay gap between the genders
and the degradation of gendered jobs).
110. One notable discussion of children's rights in 1977 is striking in the
NOW materials in part because there is nothing else like it. See Mary Grace
Plaskett, Bill of Rights for Children, Do IT NOW, Feb. 1977, at 4 (arguing that
high quality child care and education free of sex role stereotyping are essential
in order to eradicate sexism).
111. This discussion is based on a review of the NOW papers at the
Schelsinger Library conducted by Elizabeth Tobin (on file with the author).
112. See Karen DeCrow, Universal Child Care Is a NOW Priority, NATIONAL
NOW Tims, Apr. 1989, at 4 ("Since NOW's founding in 1967, child care has
been an issue on the front burner.").
113. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 20, 1977) (quoted in
Smeal on Child Care, NATIONAL NOW TIMEs, Jan. 1979, at 4).
114. HEwLETr, supra note 101, at 190; see also STENER, supra note 39, at




cies and joined labor coalitions to support maternity leave, child
care, and other family support programs. 115 In their defense, we
should note that American feminists supported welfare rights in
general without framing them as children's rights. 116 Moreover,
perhaps American women's organizations declined to pursue a
more expansive social welfare agenda, including child care,
human services, family allowances, and medical care for chil-
dren, because of a political climate hostile to such ideas. 117 Yet
Betty Friedan, looking back on the women's movement she
helped launch, proposed a new focus on meeting the needs of
children and families." 8 Friedan called for a "second stage" for
the women's movement, one that would advocate family-friendly
policies such as child-care, flex-time for workers, and other re-
forms that would respond to the influx of women in the paid la-
bor force." 9 These recommendations had something in common
with the century-long child welfare tradition the Progressives
20
launched, although they show a distinctively late twentieth-
century focus on women's equality.
Critics who blame the women's movement for children's un-
met needs too often think that massive numbers of women, in-
cluding mothers of young children, entered the paid labor force
in the 1970s and 1980s as a political statement. Evidence sug-
gests instead that most women joined the paid labor force due to
economic necessity, as men's salaries failed to meet families'
needs.' 21 Rising divorce rates and growing numbers of single-
parent households also necessitated women's paid labor.
115. HEwLETT, supra note 101, at 138-48; see generally SHEILA B. KAM-
MERMAN & ALFRED J. KAHN, STARTING RIGHT: How AMERICA NEGLECTS ITS
YOUNGEST CHILDREN AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1995) (comparing the
American gender and family policies with those of other countries and then pro-
posing various reforms).
116. See Katha Pollitt, Welfare Reform: Many Feminist Voices Lead to Al-
most As Many Messages, CH. TRIa., July 17, 1994, at 6 (arguing that although
feminists have supported the welfare rights of women and children, they need
to do more).
117. See id. (stating that the women's movement campaigns for such ideas
"can hardly be helped along if the government officially declares that single
mothers are social parasites").
118. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE (1981). In her own best-selling
Backlash, Susan Faludi charged Friedan with revisionism in writing The Sec-
ond Stage and contributing to a backlash against feminism. See FALUDI, supra
note 103, at 318-25.
119. FRIEDAN, supra note 118, at 201-342.
120. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing the changes
the Progressive Era reformers advocated).
121. See David Ellwood, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERIcAN FAMILY
47-52 (1988) (discussing women's increased participation in the labor force);
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Whatever the cause, by the start of the 1980s, the move-
ment for children's rights had failed to secure a coherent polit-
ical or intellectual foundation, not to mention a viable
constituency with political clout. The movement triggered de-
fenses of traditional authority, yet it also continued to inspire a
small but forceful set of advocates for children in the courts and
in the legislatures. The patchwork of judicial decisions gov-
erning children's legal status placed only the barest cover over
continuing ambivalence. It remained possible to argue that
young people deserve the same legal treatment as adults, that
young people deserve special legal protections differing from the
law for adults, and that law should refrain from intruding on the
ordinary practices of adults responsible for children.1 22
One expert reported in 1981 that Supreme Court opinions
sounded like a fugue:
You can discern three distinct themes: First, that parents have pri-
mary responsibility to raise children. Second, that the state has spe-
cial responsibilities to children, to intervene and protect them. And
third, that children as people have rights of their own and have rights
as individuals in relation to the family and in relation to the state.
These themes are constantly in conflict.
123
These three elements each make sense individually, but no clear
lines demark which view should prevail in a given case. The ab-
sence of a clear conception of children's legal status permitted
people to blame parents for failures of state responsibility, to
blame the state for failures of parental responsibility, and to
view children's rights as threats to both parental and state au-
thority.124 These blame-games grew into criticisms of the wel-
fare state and even the New Deal safety-net programs, and
helped to create the insecurity of children during the Reagan
years and since.
William J. Wilson & Katherine M. Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure:
The Widening Gap Between Evidence and Public Policy Issues, in FIGHTING Pov-
ERTY: WHAT WoRKs AND WHAT DOESN'T 232, 246-47 (Sheldon Danziger &
Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (discussing the relationship between women's
labor force participation and marital relations).
122. See generally Knitzer, supra note 92, at 481 (discussing the scope of
legal activities affecting children and examining the major criticisms of such
activities).
123. Glenn Collins, Debate Over Rights of Children Is Intensifying, N.Y.
Tiras, July 21, 1981, at Al, B4 (quoting Robert Mnookin, Professor of Law at
the University of California at Berkeley).
124. See id. (discussing different viewpoints of various advocacy groups).
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IV. BRINGING THE STORY TO THE PRESENT: SOCIAL
RESOURCE REDISTRIBUTION
The insecurity of American children in the last decades of
the twentieth century became cause for some attention, but also
continued to reflect how many adults use the topic "children" to
serve their own political agendas. 125 A New York Times re-
porter wrote the following in 1981 while assessing the Reagan
administration's plans to cut services for children: "The chil-
dren's rights movement, a stepchild of the liberation struggles of
the 1960's, has grown into a force affecting the battle over bil-
lions of Federal dollars, a host of Government services, and an
ever-increasing number of issues involving parents and the
courts."126 In contrast, consider this 1977 statement by Gilbert
Steiner, a leading expert on the needs of children: "We have had
several opportunities in recent years to develop theories of inter-
vention and I find the most depressing single aspect of the child-
development movement in this country to be that each of these
opportunities has been a failure."127 No dramatic accomplish-
ments of a children's rights movement occurred in the interven-
ing five years; instead, observers with different perspectives
made what they wanted of the rhetoric of children's rights in the
service of their own political purposes.
From the perspective of advocates for children, legislative
efforts to provide quality early childhood education, health care
for families, and universal protections against poverty went no-
where, initiatives to protect children from abuse by their par-
ents and guardians failed to stem rising rates of reported abuse,
and children too often seemed victims of a violent world indiffer-
125. See generally DAVID A. HAMBURG, TODAY'S CHILDREN (1992) (examining
threats to children's physical and emotional well-being along with failures of
public responses).
126. Collins, supra note 123, at 1. But see Leo, supra note 12, at 5 ("In the
world of public policy, the children's rights movement is still alive, but not
thriving, largely because it is essentially irrelevant to the current crisis of the
family. American children are not suffering from too much parental authority,
but from far too little. Rich or poor, children are much more likely to be ignored
and psychically abandoned than they are to be 'oppressed' by parental fas-
cists."); PuRDY, supra note 105, at 214 ("[B]y severing asymmetrical legal ties
that now bind parents and children together, equal rights would weaken appro-
priate parental authority.").
127. MILTON J.E. SENN, SPEAKING OUT FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 193 (1977)
(quoting from an excerpt of the oral history of Gilbert Steiner).
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ent to their needs. 128 Head Start,129 often described as the one
demonstrated success of the 1960s War on Poverty,1 30 remained
underfunded and thus unavailable for many eligible children.
From the perspective of critics, even the limited legislative
achievements for children - special education for children with
disabilities, expanded public expenditures for protecting chil-
dren from abuse and neglect, and poverty programs benefiting
children and their parents - seemed to be wasteful and bureau-
cratic burdens on schools, parents, and states.1 31 Underlying
divisons about the proper role of the government in private life
and about race, poverty, immigration, gender, and religion seem
more at work in this discussion than an honest assessment of
children's entitlements in this society.
One way to stand outside these debates is to compare the
status of children during this period with the status of the eld-
erly. Strikingly, the elderly moved out of poverty and benefitted
from strengthened public programs meeting their financial and
medical needs at the same time that more children fell into pov-
erty and federal and state governments cut public programs for
children.132 Paul Peterson offered one comparison along these
lines and concluded with the "immodest proposal" that children
obtain voting powers to begin to duplicate the successes of the
elderly.' 3
3
Perhaps because children do not vote, adults invoke the in-
terests of children on divisive social issues. In the 1980s and
1990s, legislative and judicial battles over abortion rights spilled
into the children's rights terrain as pro-choice advocates sought
rights for minors and pro-life advocates lobbied for parental con-
sent or notification procedures.' 34 This may be one of many in-
128. See generally Douglas J. Besharov, How Child Abuse Programs Hurt
Poor Children: The Misuse of Foster Care, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 219 (1988)
(arguing that social agencies are overreacting to cases of social deprivation
among poor children and causing them to suffer more harm in foster homes).
129. See generally ZIGLER & MUENCHOW, supra note 44 (discussing the Head
Start program).
130. See LYNDON BAins JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE PoINT: PERSPECTIVES OF
THE PRESIDENCY 69-87, 220-21 (1971) (offering President Lyndon Johnson's ex-
planation of this effort).
131. See generally Besharov, supra note 128 (discussing failures of such pro-
grams and their effects on the children).
132. Paul E. Peterson, An Immodest Proposal, 121 DAEDALUS 151, 151-59
(1992).
133. Id. at 170-72.
134. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,
432-42 (1983) (upholding as constitutional a statute that required all minors
under the age of fifteen to obtain parental consent or court order before receiv-
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stances in which the topic of children's rights constitutes only a
superficial frame for what more fairly is a larger national contro-
versy with little opportunity to put children's interests into the
picture. Thus, the abortion controversy involves religion, gender
roles, and the place of federal courts in politics, but has little to
do with the well-being of children, once born, or teens, once ca-
pable of sexual activity. In a very practical way, the national
controversy over abortion fuels local disputes over the distribu-
tion of condoms in high schools, which also touches on the
equally hot topics for public health and morality -- HIV and
other sexually transmitted diseases. One thing is clear: social
ambivalence about children's rights will not offer a path through
this thicket. Other agendas will prevail, just as they did when
the Clinton administration recently responded to the pharma-
ceutical industry and abandoned plans for a national distribu-
tion of vaccinations to assure immunization of all children.
13 5
Crime control is another agenda driving the treatment of
children and producing incoherent results. Some new develop-
ments on the "child liberation front" would surprise and might
dismay child liberationists from the 1960s. For example, some
children now may receive adult treatment for purposes of crimi-
nal prosecution, sentencing, and corrections, 136  and the
Supreme Court has rejected a cruel and unusual punishment
challenge to the death penalty for a person who committed a
ing an abortion), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644-51 (1979) (upholding as constitu-
tional a statute that requires an unmarried woman under eighteen to obtain
parental consent or a court order before receiving an abortion).
135. Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate: Immunizations, N.Y. TImEs, Aug.
23, 1994, at Al. Immigration policy is another in which children's rights be-
comes a superficial topic caught in the midst of a larger debate. See, e.g., Reno
v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993) (rejecting a substantive due process chal-
lenge to an Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation requiring un-
documented children be released only to the custody of certain relatives); Reena
Shah Stamets, Like It or Not, Immigration Debate Is Coming Your Way, RocKy
MTN. NEWS, May 7, 1995, at 99A (discussing California's Proposition 187 and
its effect on children).
136. Michael J. Dale, The Burger Court and Children's Rights - A Trend
Toward Retribution?, 8 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 7, 8 (1987); see also Gregory
J. Skibinski & Ann M. Koszuth, Getting Tough With Juvenile Offenders: Ignor-
ing the Best Interests of the Child, 37 Juv. & F m. CT. J. 43, 45-49 (1986) (dis-
cussing major Supreme Court decisions affecting juveniles). Perhaps the
liberationist rhetoric of the sixties reflected a kind of romanticism about espe-
cially privileged children; if so, it is especially ironic that poor and minority




crime as a minor.137 Despite the calls by numerous academic
commentators for the abolition of the juvenile court in order to
assure children the same legal treatment accorded adults,'138 the
juvenile justice system retains diminished protections for juve-
nile offenders. At the same time, the Supreme Court has ruled
that public schools do not need to apply adult-style standards
governing searches or freedom of speech in dealing with viola-
tions of school rules, suspected drug use, or school discipline.
13 9
What joins these decisions is a sense that the world is a danger-
ous place and that young people both face and pose serious risks,
requiring a public response. Children's rights advocates in the
1960s and 1970s may never have imagined children with AIDS,
infants exposed in utero to crack, or the massive dissemination
of guns to children, but these are pressing issues in the 1990s. 14 0
Efforts to change public policies to protect these children are en-
meshed in efforts to regulate and punish "bad mothers" who are
so frequently perceived to be poor and black or Hispanic. 14 '
137. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
138. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing
the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv.
1083, 1118 (1991) (arguing that separate and unequal juvenile courts should be
abolished); Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Propo-
sal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CoNrrEmP. L. 23, 35-51
(1990) (discussing statistical and constitutional trends that support the aboli-
tion of the juvenile court); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991) (arguing that the failure to reform juvenile
courts calls for their abolition). For earlier proposals, see MARTIN GUCGOGEEIM,
JUVENILE RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE ACLU 3 (1978) (reviewing the historical back-
ground of the juvenile justice system); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The
Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Ob-
solete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1120, 1132-35 (1977) (proposing the abolition of the
juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction). But see Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving
Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1 Wis. L.
REV. 163 (1993) (providing a contemporary defense of the juvenile court
system).
139. See Dale, supra note 136, at 11 (stating that in New Jersey v. T.L.O,
469 U.S. 724 (1985), the Supreme Court required schools to have only a reason-
able suspicion under the circumstances); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 680-86 (1986) (holding that, although adults may use offensive
speech, public schools do not have to permit a child to use the same speech).
140. See generally Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the
Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993 (1994) (discussing general
changes of family and society and their relation to the family and juvenile court
systems).
141. See Richard Whitmire, Almost 1 Million Mothers Would Lose Welfare:
Census, GAsNNr NEws SERv., Mar. 2, 1995 (stating that the Census Bureau
found that 25% of black mothers 15 to 44 received welfare benefits, nearly 20%




Again, agendas unrelated to children are hard at work. Other
kinds of social dilemmas and the political reactions they elicit
swamp rights for children, however conceptualized.
The recent flap about Republican welfare reform proposals
that could send poor children to orphanages represents one more
example of a public controversy triggering talk of children's
rights but reflecting a different agenda and set of issues. A bill
authored by a Congressman elected in the November 1994 Re-
publican sweep of the Congress would end welfare benefits for
parents after two years and offer no aid to single mothers under
age eighteen or to any mother who failed to establish the child's
paternity.142 The author acknowledged that the bill's policies
would render many parents unable to care for their children and
therefore would expand orphanages. 143 Following the recom-
mendations of author Charles Murray, the bill and similar pro-
posals seek to end births out of wedlock by ending aid to single
mothers. 44 Apparently, President Clinton's proposed welfare
plan also would result in putting some poor children in orphan-
ages. 145 House Speaker Newt Gingrich quickly spoke in favor of
the orphanage idea and Hillary Rodham Clinton attacked it.
When Republicans attacked Clinton, Gingrich said the whole de-
bate had become distorted and cheap.1 46 Commentators re-
vealed that orphanages would be far more expensive than
welfare and advocates on both sides agreed that a family setting
affords the best care for children.1 47 The bill's sponsor said he
later regretted the orphanage idea.1 48 In retrospect, the whole
dispute gave a new life to the word "Dickensian" and an old
movie called "Boys' Town."149 It did not, however, elevate the
142. See William M. Welch, Orphanage Talk Brings an Outcry, USA TODAY,
Dec. 6, 1994, at 4A (discussing bill introduced by Representative James Talent).
143. Id.
144. Id. Births outside of marriage have increased from 5% in 1960 to 22%
in 1985, and from 22% in the African-American community in 1960 to 60% in
1985. David Popenoe, Family Decline in America, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A
NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMLY 39, 40-43 (David Blankenhorn et
al. eds., 1990).
145. William Douglas, Welfare Plan Hit by GOP, NEWSDAY, Jan. 11, 1995, at
A19.
146. First Lady Seeks Truce in Orphanage Debate, CHI. TRm., Jan. 8, 1994,
at 4.
147. Welch, supra note 142, at 4A
148. Id.
149. One writer noted:
When Newt Gingrich first uttered that dreaded word on television, the
Democratic Party and the liberal press pounced with glee: "Dickensian
orphanages" were the Republicans' solution to the problem of poverty.
When Hillary Rodham Clinton denounced any plan to put children of
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place of children's needs or rights in the debate over welfare
reform.
As of May, 1995, the Congress was considering cuts in
school lunches, nutrition programs for pregnant women and in-
fants, social security assistance for children with disabilities,
and special education. One cartoonist depicted congressional
leaders noting, "we tried a war on poverty; we tried war on
drugs; let's try a war on children."1 50 In responses to the pro-
posed cuts, at least some people will use mass media to focus
attention during this political season on the situation of children
in poverty. For example, CDF and other organizations docu-
ment the increasing percentage of American children in pov-
erty.15 ' Those statistics reveal that by 1990, families with
children under three became the single largest group living in
poverty in this country; 25% of all such families lived below the
poverty line.' 52 Stated another way, one fifth of all children are
poor, and children make up 40% of the poor in this country.
15s
Again, the success in fighting poverty among the elderly during
the same decades raises real questions about the equity in pub-
lic policy.' 54 The racial disparities in the circumstances of chil-
dren are also striking - 50% of African-American and 40% of
poor, unwed mothers into orphanages as "unbelievable and absurd,"
Gingrich suggested that she rent a video of the 1938 Mickey Rooney-
Spencer Tracy film about Boys Town, whereupon he was accused of
confusing reality with "Hollywood illusion."
Gertrude Himmelfarb, Why Not Try Orphanages, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1995,
Outlook Section at 1; see also Mary McGrory, In Defense of "Orphanages", Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1994, at 23 (discussing the debate between Clinton and
Gingrich).
150. Wasserman, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1994, at 22.
151. James D. Weill, Child Poverty in America, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
336, 339-43 (1925) (adapted from CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILD POVERTY
IN AMERICA (June 1991)); see also CARNEGIE TASK FORCE ON MEETING THE
NEEDS OF YOUNG CHILDREN, CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., STARTING POINTS: MEET-
ING THE NEEDS OF OUR YOUNGEST CHILDREN 3-5 (1994) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
TASK FORCE] (identifying and suggesting solutions to problems facing children
during their first three years of life); Marian Wright Edelman, Invest in Our
Young - or Else, Huxim RTS., Summer 1989, at 19, 20 (discussing the CDF's
"investment goals").
152. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE, supra note 151, at 17.
153. RAY MARSHALL, THE STATE OF FAMILES: LOSING DIRECTION 29 (1991).
154. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE, supra note 151, at 18 (noting that social
policy can and does improve the economic conditions of some groups); Peterson,
supra note 132, at 160 (linking this contradiction to the voting status of the
elderly as opposed to that of children).
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Latino children under the age of six live in poverty.'5 5 A focus
on children in poverty may seem like yet another agenda using
children; it serves as the basis for a fourth position on children's
rights: social resource distribution.
Some child protectionists long have sought redistribution of
resources to help children. Redistributionists throughout the
past century often focused on children as an appealing group for
making their case. A 1980s-style campaign for investment in
children is still underway in some parts of the corporate commu-
nity, but it seems to have had little effect on the congressional
debate. For better or for worse, redistribution questions in this
country will be legislative ones, requiring electoral coalitions.
156
This is precisely the method that has proved unsuccessful in va-
ried efforts organized around children who have no ability to
vote themselves.
157
V. FORECASTING THE FUTURE: A NEW FIGHT OVER
HUMAN RIGHTS
I have no plan or even hope for mobilizing public support for
children, especially poor children, at this point in American his-
tory. Each of the four rhetorics - child protection, children's
liberation, children's rights as potential adults, and redistribu-
tion - have failed to find a strong constituency. Instead, polit-
ical figures win strong support by invoking conventional
authority structures, family privacy, and self-reliance, and by
attacking a social welfare state. It is tempting to look at other
Western industrialized countries and to wonder why state-sub-
sidized health care, day care, child allowances, and other pro-
grams are so well-established elsewhere but so politically
infeasible here. The failure of the varied rhetorics for children,
however, can be only a symptom of and not an explanation for
the failure of initiatives for children here.
155. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UN-
MET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAImEs, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT
RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL AcTION 10 (1993).
156. The Court has refused to view wealth as a suspect classification. See
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (noting that "where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equal-
ity or precisely equal advantages").
157. See, e.g., STEINER, supra note 39, at 9-13 (tracing failed cbildren's
rights initiatives of the late 1960s in spite of golden opportunities for change);
Zigler & Muenchow, supra note 43, at 416 (describing setbacks in child and




What, then, might explain the failure of children's initia-
tives? History suggests four. First, children do not vote, and no
other lobby has appeared on their behalf.158 Second, we have
seen cycles of reform and disillusionment, epitomized by
changes in juvenile court. The reforms of one generation become
the problems to be reformed by a later generation; the earlier
reforms and subsequent problems then caution against further
reform. Third, children's needs are connected to larger, intrac-
table issues, such as the economy's failure to provide good jobs
for many people, the presence of women in the paid labor force
without reallocation of some of child care from mothers to fa-
thers and others, negative views of poor parents, misallocated
health care expenditures, failures of public education, and divi-
sive conflicts over abortion and crime control. Finally, our cul-
ture and ideology produce great resistance to state intervention
in families; a resistance articulated both by the political left and
the right. Conceptions of personal responsibility and privacy,
government bungling and individual freedom, and cultural di-
versity and mutual distrust fuel this resistance. The cultural
resistance to rights for children thus reflects a fear that such
public rights would disrupt private traditions and fail to meet
children's needs compared with reliance on private families. As
a result, we treat other people's children as beyond public con-
cern. Perhaps because of our troubled heterogeneity, with his-
toric racism and intergroup distrust, we do not view other
people's children as ours in many important ways.159
Given these reasons, rhetoric alone will not alter the situa-
tion of children. Yet it is tempting to seek yet another rhetoric,
such as the emerging human rights rhetoric with which I began.
The human rights rhetoric has much appeal to those who be-
lieved in any prior version of rights for children. More practi-
cally, an occasion for political mobilization has arisen now that
the United States has signed but not yet ratified the Convention.
Because of the international framework, the United States sign-
ing could become an occasion to look beyond the parochial and
idiosyncratic views that undermine children's legal protections
in this country and consider the standards for treating children
developed elsewhere.
158. See Peterson, supra note 132, at 170-72 (proposing votes for children
after comparing reductions in poverty among seniors during the same period of
increased poverty among children).




In closing, I will explore the argument for international
human rights for children, but also will consider the limitations
of any existing rights framework for this group of human beings.
The human rights argument seeks to treat children as candi-
dates not for "children's rights," "child protections," or "adult
rights," but instead for "human rights."160 As human beings,
children deserve the kind of dignity, respect, and freedom from
arbitrary treatment that rights signal. 16 ' This dignity, respect,
and freedom does not displace or undermine parents, but in-
stead reminds parents and other adults of their fundamental re-
sponsibilities toward children.
Unlike children's liberation, the human rights formulation
rejects the pretense that children are just like adults in all re-
spects relevant to the law. Thus, the Convention calls for devel-
opment rights - rights to education, cultural activities, play
and leisure, and freedom of thought - to meet children's needs
in reaching their full potential. 162 More comprehensive than
child protection, the human rights formulation underscores that
the absence of rights exposes children to risks of abuse both by
their parents and by government actors such as teachers, social
workers, and judges. Unlike the social resource redistribution
rhetoric, this formulation focuses specifically on children and af-
fords a point for evaluating the entire range of legal treatments
160. This brings us back to the Convention, and the history of viewing chil-
dren as eligible for human rights. See generally Cynthia Price Cohen, The De-
veloping Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. THoMAs L. REV. 1 (1993)
("[The] recognition that children have unique human rights has been enshrined
in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.").
I have considered but rejected the formulation of children as potential
adults. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing Peter
Edelman's ideas). Such a view is often associated with applications of the theo-
ries of John Rawls. See Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery:
Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 11, 23-25 & nn.57-64, 68
(1994) (discussing a "liberal model of constitutional personhood" heavily influ-
enced by Rawls). It also accompanies some utilitarian views especially inter-
ested in viewing children as human capital. Id. at 30 & n.118. It is a tempting
view especially to address resource distribution questions because one may ar-
gue that as potential adults, children deserve the opportunity to develop and
reach that potential and thus should have claims upon others to provide basic
care, safety, stimulation, and education. Fitzgerald provides a comprehensive
statement criticizing this view. Id. at 30-34. This work makes the compelling
argument that viewing children as potential adults ignores their experiences as
children. Id. at 30-31.
161. The Convention explicitly recognizes children's individual personality
rights for this reason. See Cohen, supra note 160, at 5 & n.21 (defining individ-
ual personality rights as distinct from rights that belong to society in general).
162. SusAN FOUNTAIN, UNICEF, IT's ONLY RIGHT! A PRATIcAL GUIDE TO
LEARNING ABOUT THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 2 (1989).
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of children, not only those dealing with access to resources.
Thus, as human beings, children deserve economic and social
benefits appropriate to their needs.
1 63
Human rights in the international sphere depend upon the
development of a community that believes in them rather than
an authority - court or legislature - that will enforce them.
The vulnerability of international human rights for children
to the willingness and commitments of adults at first seems like
a weakness, a failure to secure something with force. This vul-
nerability in another sense, however, becomes a strength be-
cause it reveals how dependent and interdependent children are
upon adults. Organizing to influence and shape such a commu-
nity may line up means and ends in precisely the way most im-
portant for children. Without adults who believe in the
importance and entitlements of children, no phrase, judicial or-
der, or legislative statement will alter their conditions.
In a basic sense, all rights - for adults as well as for chil-
dren - require a commitment by others to recognize the claims
of others and to behave accordingly. Freedoms of association
and religion, rights to marry and to procreate, and rights to
maintain relationships with family members164 all depend upon
community commitments to include the rights-bearers in the
group deserving respect and attention.
Rights rhetorics in the past have tended too often to imply
only freedom from - freedom from state control, freedom from
interference by others. Children may need some forms of such
freedoms but they also need guidance, involvement, support,
and even control to protect them from harms against which they
cannot protect themselves. I suggest that nothing inherent in
rights rhetorics prevents acknowledging these needs of children.
At the same time, the rhetoric of rights is the coin of the realm
in national, and increasingly in international, law and politics.
Not only does invoking this language put children on the map of
public concern, it also crucially "impl[ies] a respect which places
163. Cohen, supra note 160, at 8 & n.31. Some describe these benefits as
survival rights which include provision for an adequate living standard, shelter,
nutrition, and access to medical services. FoUNrAIN, supra note 162, at 2.
164. This is a theme I have tried to develop elsewhere. See MARTHA MINoW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXcLUSION, AND AMEICAN LAW 267-
311 (1990) (exploring rights as fundamental features and expressions of com-
munal relationships); Minow, supra note 69, at 16 (arguing that the concept of




one in the referential range of self and others, which elevates
one's status from human body to social being."
165
Many may ask whether it is practical to press for human
rights on behalf of children.166 A negative answer might arise
given the considerable resources right-wing groups muster in
opposing such rights as interference in their privacy.1 67 The his-
tory of the children's rights movements throughout this century
casts further doubt on the practicality of a human rights effort
for children. By the 1980s, children's rights, as a phrase in
search of a program, encompassed many contrasting and even
conflicting commitments to children without a notable improve-
ment of circumstances for many, many children. Whether styled
as children's liberation or child protection, or as social welfare
redistribution programs, each effort found powerful opponents
poised against it. Moreover, the conventional conception of
rights as implying an autonomous person who needs freedom
from interference seems ill-suited to meeting the needs of most
children.
Yet the past does not determine our future, but instead of-
fers a set of lessons about the relationship between ideals and
contingent realities. Powerful concepts like rights are amenable
to new interpretations and applications that may in turn make
good on their earlier promise and deeper meanings. So I suggest
we roll up our sleeves and work on every front - our own work-
places, schools, communities, and states, our Congress, our med-
ical care, our world - to explore what it would mean to view
children as human beings entitled to human rights, or else find a
better way to summon attention and resources on their behalf.
165. PATICIA WILIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 153 (1991).
166. Some U.S. advocates for human rights worry that placing too high a
priority on children's rights may defeat other human rights efforts currently
underway. Given the history of the response to the convention on genocide and
the way right-wing interest groups are currently targeting the children's rights
convention, this worry is legitimate. The worry really raises the political
calculus and priority of purposes: Should one abandon the convention on chil-
dren's rights because it is controversial or should one support it to weigh in on
the controversy?
167. See, e.g., Samuel Francis, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Guide to Child-Rear-
ing, WASH. T~nms, Mar. 14, 1995, at A19 (asserting that "by signing onto the
Convention, the British have opened themselves to the charge of violating an
international agreement, and they've handed a stick to the child lobby with
which they can be beaten, even if their children can't be").
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